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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 A chaque problème de choix constitué d'un ensemble d'options réalisables et 
d'un statu quo, une règle de sélection fait correspondre un sous-ensemble des options 
réalisables. Nous étudions la "rationalisabilité" collective de telles règles. Plus 
précisément, nous analysons les conditions sous lesquelles il existe n relations d'ordre 
par rapport auxquelles les options sélectionnées sont efficaces et dominent le statu 
quo. 
 
Mots clés : choix social, efficacité, rationalité 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 We analyze collective choice procedures with respect to their 
rationalizability by means of profiles of individual preference orderings. A 
selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected 
alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to 
the set of feasible options. Given the number of agents n, a selection function 
satisfies efficient and non-deteriorating n-rationalizability if there exists a profile of 
n orderings on the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives 
are (i) efficient for that profile, and (ii) at least as good as the reference option 
according to each individual preference. We analyze efficient and non-
deteriorating collective choice in a general abstract framework and provide a 
characterization result given a universal set domain. 
 
Key words : social choice, efficiency, individual reationality 
 
 
1 Introduction
This paper contributes to a recent line of research that seeks to identify the testable
restrictions of various theories of multi-agent decision-making. The approach is clearly
in the spirit of the classical revealed preference analysis of choice initiated by Samuel-
son (1938, 1948), Arrow (1959), Richter (1966, 1971), Hansson (1968), Sen (1971) and
others. However, while most earlier contributions in this area are concerned with the
rationalizability of observed choices by means of a single (individual or social) preference
relation, we ask whether there exists a proﬁle of preference orderings—one ordering for
each individual—such that the observed choices are obtained for this (not necessarily
unique) proﬁle according to the collective choice theory to be tested. In that respect,
the approach of this paper resembles the analysis of Banerjee and Pattanaik (1996) who
also deal with notions of rationality involving multiple preferences. The central question
is: if preferences are not observable, how can we determine whether a given set of actual
collective choices is consistent with a particular theory? More precisely, can we formulate
necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which the observed behavior of the agents is
rationalizable by some proﬁle of preferences for the theory under examination?
While the question is relevant for all theories of collective choices, the existing literature
has mostly focused on non-cooperative equilibrium concepts. In particular, Sprumont
(2000) examines necessary and suﬃcient for Nash rationalizability, deﬁned as follows.
Suppose we can observe a collection of feasible sets of actions and a set of observed
outcomes for each feasible set. These observations are Nash rationalizable if there exists
a proﬁle of preferences deﬁned on combinations of these actions such that, for each game
deﬁned by a set of feasible actions and the restriction of these preferences to the associated
combinations of feasible actions, the set of observed outcomes consists of the set of Nash
equilibria of the game. Ray and Zhou (2001) perform a similar exercise for subgame-
perfect equilibria.
Here, we analyze two notions that play an elementary but fundamental role in essen-
tially all cooperative approaches to collective choices: (Pareto) eﬃciency and individual
rationality. Eﬃciency is well deﬁned as soon as agents are assumed to possess preferences.
Individual rationality, on the other hand, supposes the existence of a status quo or refer-
ence alternative: the requirement is that no agent should be worse oﬀ at a selected outome
than at this status quo. From now on, we call such choices “non-deteriorating” to avoid
any confusion with the widespread interpretation of rationality as preference-maximizing
behavior. Understanding eﬃcient and non-deteriorating behavior is a modest but essen-
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tial step towards a complete study of solution concepts such as the core (see Bossert and
Sprumont, 2002) and (selections from) the set of Walrasian equilibria in an economy (see
Brown and Matzkin, 1996).
We explore the testable restrictions of these hypotheses in a simple yet plausible frame-
work. A selection function assigns, to each pair constiting of a feasible set of alternatives
(included in some universal set) and a reference alternative (belonging to the feasible set),
a subset of that feasible set. Alternatives have no particular structure and feasible sets
are not restricted. This very general abstract model is developed by Zhou (1997) and also
used in Bossert and Sprumont (2001) and Masatli and Ok (2002). While these papers are
concerned with individual behavior, the model itself is perfectly suited to the analysis of
collective choices as well. In an n-agent society, we call a selection function eﬃcient and
non-deteriorating (or, more precisely, ENDn-rationalizable) if there exists a proﬁle of pref-
erence orderings, one for each of the n agents, according to which all selected alternatives
are Pareto-eﬃcient and at least as good as the status quo for every agent.
The implications of either of these two requirements are known. Bossert and Sprumont
(2001) characterize non-deteriorating behavior, both in an abstract framework analogous
to the one considered here and in a more structured economic environment. Eﬃciency
by itself, on the other hand, imposes no restriction (if n ≥ 2) because two agents may
be assumed to have opposite preferences, in which case all alternatives in the universal
set are eﬃcient. The interplay between the two requirements, however, turns out to be
interestingly complex: when added to the non-deterioration condition, eﬃciency generates
substantial additional restrictions.
Much in the spirit of Richter (1966), we begin by identifying an END-congruence
property that is necessary for ENDn-rationalizability. Our ﬁrst theorem states that this
condition is also suﬃcient if the cardinality of the universal set is smaller than 2(n + 1).
Moreover, for universal sets with 2(n+1) or more elements, there exist selection functions
that are END-congruent but not ENDn-rationalizable. Our second theorem focuses on
the case where only the reference alternative varies: it asserts that the END-congruence
property is also suﬃcient for any cardinality when all feasible sets under consideration
coincide with the universal set.
2 Arbitrary Domains
The set of positive integers is denoted by IN. Let X be a nonempty universal set, and let
N = {1, . . . , n} with n ∈ IN be the set of agents. P(X) is the power set of X excluding the
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empty set. The cardinality of X is denoted by |X|. A quasi-ordering on X is a reﬂexive
and transitive relation R ⊆ X × X, and an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering. A
binary relation R on X is antisymmetric if (xRy and yRx) implies x = y for all x, y ∈ X.
For notational convenience, we write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R. Let Rd be the diagonal
on X, that is, for all x, y ∈ X,
xRdy ⇔ x = y.
The inverse R−1 of a binary relation R on X is deﬁned by
xR−1y ⇔ yRx
for all x, y ∈ X. The transitive closure R of a binary relation R on X is deﬁned as follows:
for all x, y ∈ X, xRy if there exist K ∈ IN and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x = x0, xk−1Rxk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y.
We consider collective choice problems where, in addition to a feasible set of alterna-
tives, a reference alternative is part of the description of a choice situation. This reference
alternative, which is assumed to be an element of the feasible set, can be interpreted as the
status quo or the currently realized alternative in an intertemporal sequence of choices.
In more structured environments such as exchange economies where the alternatives are
allocations, the reference alternative could be a distribution of the total endowments in
the economy.
Formally, a selection problem is a pair (S, y) such that S ∈ P(X) and y ∈ S. The
domain of selection problems is D = ∅. A selection function is a mapping C:D → P(X)
such that C(S, y) ⊆ S for all (S, y) ∈ D.
A selection function satisﬁes eﬃcient and non-deteriorating rationalizability if there
exists a proﬁle of orderings on the universal set of alternatives such that the selected
alternatives are (i) eﬃcient for that proﬁle, and (ii) at least as good as the reference option
according to each individual preference. Because any selection function is rationalizable
in that sense if we permit the degenerate case of the universal indiﬀerence relation, we
require the components of the rationalizing proﬁle to be antisymmetric; see also Bossert
and Sprumont (2001).
Clearly, the existence of a proﬁle rationalizing C in the above sense depends on the
number of individuals in a society. Therefore, we use the following deﬁnition of eﬃcient
and non-deteriorating (END) n-rationalizability of a selection function C.
ENDn-Rationalizability: There exists a proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) of antisymmetric orderings
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such that, for all (S, y) ∈ D and for all x ∈ C(S, y),
xRiy for all i ∈ N (1)
and
{z ∈ S \ {x} | zRix for all i ∈ N} = ∅. (2)
If a proﬁle of antisymmetric orderings (R1, . . . , Rn) is such that (1) and (2) are satisﬁed,
we say that (R1, . . . , Rn) ENDn-rationalizes C.
The implications of requiring (1) alone are analyzed in Bossert and Sprumont (2001).
Condition (2) by itself does not impose any restriction if n ≥ 2: for any selection function
C, there exists a proﬁle of antisymmetric orderings (R1, . . . , Rn) such that (2) is satisﬁed—
just let R1 be an arbitrary antisymmetric ordering and let R2 = . . . = Rn be the inverse
of R1.
Combined with (1), (2) does impose additional restrictions. Consider the following
example.
Example 1 Let X = {x, y, z}, D = {(X, y), (X, z)}, C(X, y) = {x} and C(X, z) = {y}.
There exists a proﬁle of antisymmetric orderings such that (1) is satisﬁed but any such
proﬁle must be such that xRiy for all i ∈ N ; this is the case because x is chosen when
y is the reference alternative and, consequently, non-deteriorating choice demands that
everyone prefer x to y. Because x ∈ X and C(X, z) = {y}, this contradicts eﬃciency.
According to the traditional rational-choice model, an alternative x is revealed preferred
(in the weak sense; indiﬀerence is permitted) to an alternative y if x is chosen in a situation
where y is feasible. An analogous relation can be established in our framework. In
contrast to the standard deﬁnition of the revealed-preference relation, a chosen alternative
is not necessarily (weakly) preferred to all feasible alternatives but merely to the reference
alternative. Thus, as in Bossert and Sprumont (2001), we can deﬁne a relation RC as
follows: for all x, y ∈ X,
xRCy ⇔ ∃S ∈ P(X) such that (S, y) ∈ D and x ∈ C(S, y).
The following lemma is the counterpart of a result established by Samuelson (1938, 1948)
in the standard revealed-preference framework; see also Richter (1971).
Lemma 1 Let n ∈ IN. If (R1, . . . , Rn) ENDn-rationalizes C, then RC ⊆ ⋂i∈N Ri.
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Proof. Suppose (R1, . . . , Rn) ENDn-rationalizes C.
First, we show that RC ⊆ ⋂i∈N Ri. Suppose xRCy for x, y ∈ X. Then there exists
S ∈ P(X) such that (S, y) ∈ D and x ∈ C(S, y). By part (a) of ENDn-rationalizability,
this implies xRiy for all i ∈ N .
Now suppose xRCy for x, y ∈ X. Then there exist K ∈ IN and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such
that x = x0, xk−1RCxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. Let i ∈ N . Because RC ⊆ Ri,
it follows that xk−1Rixk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Because Ri is transitive, this implies xRiy.
This is true for all i ∈ N , and the proof is complete.
Note that only (1) rather than the full requirement of ENDn-rationalizability is needed
in the above result.
The following axiom is necessary for ENDn-rationalizability. It is also suﬃcient if, in a
sense speciﬁed in the following theorem, |X| is small relative to n. See Richter (1966) for
a congruence axiom that is necessary and suﬃcient for rational choice in the traditional
revealed-preference model.
END-Congruence: For all x, y ∈ X and for all (S, z) ∈ D, if xRCy, x = y and x ∈ S,
then y ∈ C(S, z).
We obtain
Theorem 1 Let n ∈ IN \ {1}.
(i) If C is ENDn-rationalizable, then C satisﬁes END-congruence.
(ii) If |X| < 2(n+1) and C satisﬁes END-congruence, then C is ENDn-rationalizable.
(iii) If |X| ≥ 2(n + 1), then there exists a selection function C satisfying END-
congruence and violating ENDn-rationalizability.
Proof. To prove part (i) of the theorem, suppose C violates END-congruence. Then
there exist x, y ∈ X and (S, z) ∈ D such that xRCy, x = y, x ∈ S and y ∈ C(S, z).
By Lemma 1, xRiy for all i ∈ N for any proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) that ENDn-rationalizes C,
contradicting (2).
To prove part (ii), suppose |X| < 2(n + 1) and C satisﬁes END-congruence. Let
R0 = RC ∪Rd. By deﬁnition, R0 is a quasi-ordering.
Furthermore, R0 is antisymmetric as a consequence of END-congruence. To prove this
claim, suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist two distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X
such that xR0y and yR0x. By deﬁnition of R0, this implies xRCy and yRCx. Hence, there
exist K,L ∈ IN, x0, . . . , xK ∈ X and z0, . . . , zL ∈ X such that x = x0, xk−1RCxk for all
5
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK = y, y = z0, z	−1RCz	 for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L}, and zL = x. Without loss
of generality, suppose zL−1 = x (if not, replace zL−1 with the highest-numbered z	 that is
diﬀerent from x; this is always possible because x = y). By deﬁnition, we have xRCzL−1.
Because zL−1RCzL = x, there exists S ∈ P(X) such that (S, x) ∈ D and zL−1 ∈ C(S, x).
But this contradicts END-congruence because x ∈ S.
Next, we prove that (1) and (2) hold if Ri = R0 for all i ∈ N . (1) follows immediately
by deﬁnition of RC and the fact that RC ⊆ R0. Now suppose, by way of contradiction,
that (2) is not satisﬁed. Then there exist (S, z) ∈ D, x ∈ C(S, z) and y ∈ S \ {x} such
that yR0x. But this contradicts END-congruence.
To continue the proof, the following deﬁnition is useful. The dimension of a quasi-
ordering R on X is the smallest positive integer r with the property that there exist r
orderings R1, . . . , Rr whose intersection is R. For a real number α, the largest integer less
than or equal to α is denoted by [α].
We claim that the dimension of R0 does not exceed n. If |X| ≤ 3, the dimension of
R0 is less than or equal to two which, in turn, is less than or equal to n. If |X| ≥ 4,
Hiraguchi’s inequality (see Hiraguchi, 1955) implies that the dimension of R0 is less than
or equal to [|X|/2], the largest integer less than or equal to |X|/2. Because |X| < 2(n+1)
implies [|X|/2] ≤ n, it follows again that the dimension of R0 is less than or equal to n.
Thus, there exist antisymmetric orderings R1, . . . , Rn (not necessarily distinct) on X
whose intersection is R0. It is now straightforward to verify that the proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn)
ENDn-rationalizes C.
To prove part (iii) of the theorem, we adapt an example that was ﬁrst developed in
Sprumont (2001) in a diﬀerent context.
Example 2 Suppose |X| ≥ 2(n + 1). Let {a1, . . . , an+1, b1, . . . , bn+1} ⊆ X. For conve-
nience of notation, let A = {a1, . . . , an+1} and A−j = A \ {aj} for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1}.
Now deﬁne C by letting
D = ∪n+1j=1{(A ∪ {bj}, bj), ({aj, bj}, bj)}
and
C(A ∪ {bj}, bj) = A−j and C({aj, bj}, bj) = {bj} for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}.
It is straightforward to verify that C satisﬁes END-congruence. Next, by way of con-
tradiction, suppose that (R1, . . . , Rn) is a proﬁle of antisymmetric orderings that ENDn-
rationalizes C. For all i ∈ N , let x∗i be the worst element in {a1, . . . , an+1} according to Ri.
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Because the number of agents n is less than n+1, there exists at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , n+1}
such that ak is not a worst element for any i ∈ N . By deﬁnition,
akRix
∗
i for all i ∈ N. (3)
Note that x∗i = ak for all i ∈ N . By (1), we have yRibk for all y ∈ A−k and for all
i ∈ N . Therefore, in particular, x∗iRibk for all i ∈ N . Together with (3), transitivity
implies akRibk for all i ∈ N . Because bk ∈ C({ak, bk}, bk), this contradicts (2).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
An immediate corollary of part (ii) of the above theorem is that, if C satisﬁes END-
congruence and X is ﬁnite, there must exist an n ∈ IN \ {1} such that C is ENDn-
rationalizable. Furthermore, note that the assumption n > 1 is required for part (ii) of
the theorem only; clearly, parts (i) and (iii) are valid for n = 1 as well. However, since
this paper is concerned with multi-agent rationalizability, we do not state the obvious
generalizations formally.
3 The Universal Set Domain
Consider the special case where, for every choice situation, the entire set X is feasible.
That is, for all (S, y) ∈ D, S = X, and we can think of a selection function as a map-
ping that assigns a set of chosen alternatives to each reference alternative in its domain.
Hence, to simplify notation, we now use a universal selection function, deﬁned as a map-
ping CX :Y → P(X) where Y ∈ P(X). For every y ∈ Y , CX(y) is the set of selected
alternatives in X for the reference alternative y, that is, CX(y) = C(X, y) for all y ∈ Y .
The deﬁnition of ENDn-rationalizability can be simpliﬁed as follows.
Universal ENDn-Rationalizability: There exists a proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) of antisym-
metric orderings on X such that
xRiy for all y ∈ Y, for all x ∈ CX(y) and for all i ∈ N (4)
and
{y ∈ X \ {x} | yRix for all i ∈ N} = ∅ for all x ∈ CX(Y ). (5)
If a proﬁle of antisymmetric orderings (R1, . . . , Rn) is such that (4) and (5) are satisﬁed for
a universal selection function C, we say that (R1, . . . , Rn) universally ENDn-rationalizes
C.
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The counterpart of the relation RC deﬁned in the previous section is denoted by RCX ,
that is,
xRCXy ⇔ y ∈ Y and x ∈ CX(y)
for all x, y ∈ X. The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Let n ∈ IN. If (R1, . . . , Rn) universally ENDn-rationalizes CX , then RCX ⊆
⋂
i∈N Ri.
Proof. Suppose xRCXy. By deﬁnition, y ∈ Y and x ∈ CX(y), and part (a) of universal
ENDn-rationalizability implies xRiy for all i ∈ N .
Again, the full force of the universal rationalizability condition is not needed—all that
is required is (4). Because we restrict attention to problems where the feasible set is always
the entire universal set X, the relation RCX turns out to be transitive as a consequence of
a suitable formulation of the END-congruence axiom for CX . We may therefore simplify
this axiom as follows.
Universal END-Congruence: For all x, y ∈ X, if xRCXy and x = y, then y ∈ CX(Y ).
With the domain assumption considered in this section, it turns out that this axiom is
necessary and suﬃcient for ENDn-rationalizability for any value of n ∈ IN \ {1} and for
any cardinality of X. We obtain
Theorem 2 Let n ∈ IN \ {1}. CX is universally ENDn-rationalizable if and only if CX
satisﬁes universal END-congruence.
Proof. “Only if.” Suppose CX violates universal END-congruence. Then there exist
x, y ∈ X such that xRCXy, x = y and y ∈ CX(Y ). By Lemma 2, xRiy for all i ∈ N ,
contradicting (5).
“If.” Suppose CX satisﬁes universal END-congruence. Deﬁne the relation Q on X by
letting, for all x, y ∈ X,
xQy ⇔ x = y or [x ∈ CX(Y ) and y ∈ X \ CX(Y )].
That Q is reﬂexive is immediate. Note that, for all x, y ∈ X such that xQy and x = y,
we have x ∈ CX(Y ) and y ∈ X \ CX(Y ). This observation immediately implies that
Q is transitive and antisymmetric. Furthermore, we have RCX ⊆ Q by universal END-
congruence.
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Let R be an arbitrary antisymmetric ordering on X \CX(Y ), and deﬁne R0 = Q∪R.
Again, R0 is a reﬂexive, transitive and antisymmetric relation such that RCX ⊆ Q ⊆ R0.
According to the relation R0, the noncomparable pairs (x, y) are all such that both x and
y are in CX(Y ).
Let R01 be an arbitrary antisymmetric ordering on CX(Y ), and let R
0
2 = . . . = R
0
n be
the inverse of R01. Deﬁne
Ri = R
0 ∪R0i
for all i ∈ N . It is straightforward to verify that the Ri are antisymmetric orderings. It
remains to be shown that the proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) universally ENDn-rationalizes CX . That
(4) is satisﬁed follows immediately from the observation that RCX ⊆ Ri for all i ∈ N . To
prove (5), suppose x ∈ CX(Y ). This implies xQy and thus xRiy for all y ∈ X \ CX(Y )
and for all i ∈ N and, thus, no y ∈ X \ CX(Y ) can Pareto dominate x. Furthermore, we
have
xR1y or xR2y
for all y ∈ CX(Y )\{x} by deﬁnition and, thus, x cannot be Pareto dominated by another
alternative in CX(Y ) either.
4 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with a few remarks on some questions related to those discussed in this
paper. First, an obvious open problem is to ﬁnd necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for ENDn-rationalizability on arbitrary domains. In general, the existence of a proﬁle
that ENDn-rationalizes a selection function depends on the value of n, and the problem
of identifying necessary and suﬃcient conditions leads to a mathematical exercise that
is closely related to the problem of determining the dimension of an ordering; see, for
example, Dushnik and Miller (1941). Because this is an area that is still quite unsettled,
it is not too surprising that tight results are hard to come by in our framework as well.
One reason why we are able to identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for universal
set domains is that, due to the assumption that the entire universal set X is feasible for
all selection problems, all multi-agent notions of ENDn-rationalizability collapse into a
single requirement: ENDn-rationalizability is equivalent to ENDm-rationalizability for all
n,m ∈ IN \ {1}.
Another related issue concerns the application of the notion of collective rationality
introduced here to more structured environments similar to those considered by Chiappori
9
(1988) involving, for instance, private or public goods. While necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for non-deteriorating choice and for eﬃcient choice when treated separately are
known in the case where X contains allocations of consumption bundles, the combination
of the two requirements is substantially more complex. Even for the counterpart of the
universal set domain in an exchange economy, characterization results are diﬃcult to
obtain. One problem that arises is that, unlike in the abstract case where preferences are
essentially unrestricted, the usual economic assumptions on individual preferences such
as strict monotonicity and strict convexity prevent us from employing the inverse of an
arbitrary individual preference relation. Thus, the construction of rationalizing proﬁles
employed here does not translate into that environment.
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